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Generating electricity from renewable sources is more expensive than conventional approaches, but
reduces pollution externalities. Analyzing the tradeoff is much more challenging than often presumed,
because the value of electricity is extremely dependent on the time and location at which it is produced,
which is not very controllable with some renewables, such as wind and solar. Likewise, the pollution
benefits from renewable generation depend on what type of generation it displaces, which also depends
on time and location. Without incorporating these factors, cost-benefit analyses of alternatives are
likely to be misleading. However, other common arguments for subsidizing renewable power – green
jobs, energy security and driving down fossil energy prices – are unlikely to substantially alter the
analysis. The role of intellectual property spillovers is a strong argument for subsidizing energy science
research, but less persuasive as an enhancement to the value of installing current renewable energy
technologies.
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Haas School of Business




The primary public policy argument for promoting electricity generation from solar,
wind, and other renewable sources is the unpriced pollution externalities from burning
fossil fuels. Some parties advocate for renewable electricity generation to improve energy
security, price stability, or job creation as well, but these arguments are more diﬃcult
to support in a careful analysis, as I discuss later. Even comparing the higher costs
of renewables with the environmental beneﬁts, however, is not straightforward. This is
because the market value of electricity generation is very dependent on its timing, location
and other characteristics, and because quantiﬁcation of the non-market value from reduced
emissions is diﬃcult and controversial.
Since Pigou’s seminal work (Pigou, 1920), economists have understood that pricing ex-
ternalities is likely to be the best way to move behavior towards eﬃciency. In the context
of electricity, this means taxes on emissions or a tradable permit system, but such market-
based policies have garnered limited political support in the U.S. and elsewhere. Instead,
many governments have created policies to promote renewable electricity generation di-
rectly, through either subsidies or mandates. But how well do these alternative policies
substitute for pricing the negative externalities of generation from fossil fuel generation?
In this paper, I discuss the market and non-market valuation of electricity generation
from renewable energy, as well as the costs and the subsidies that are available. On a
direct cost basis, renewables are expensive, but the simple calculations don’t account for
many additional beneﬁts and costs of renewables. I begin by brieﬂy discussing studies of
the costs of renewables and conventional generation, highlighting the primary cost drivers
and their current impacts. I then discuss the many critical adjustments that are necessary
to account for the time, location, and other characteristics that vary across and within
generation technologies. Many such adjustments are idiosyncratic, diﬀering substantially
by individual project, but broader technology characteristics also play an important part
in their determinations.
The next steps in the analysis, evaluating the beneﬁts of reducing externalities with
renewables, are more diﬃcult than they may at ﬁrst seem. The timing and location of
renewable generation will impact what generation is displaced, as will the pre-existing (in
the short-run) or counter-factual (in a longer run analysis) mix of fossil fuel generation in
the system.
I then turn to other potential market failures that may aﬀect the value that renewable
2energy oﬀers and may change justiﬁcations for government policy, including job creation,
industry building, energy security, and moderating swings in energy prices. I argue that
these justiﬁcations are generally not supported empirically and in some cases are based on
faulty economic reasoning.
In normative analyses of renewable electricity generation, there is often confusion about
which economic actors are included in the welfare being evaluated. For instance, should a
small town that is considering installing solar panels on city hall count federal subsidies as
a beneﬁt or just a transfer? Though economic analyses often draw a bright line between
private and public beneﬁts, renewable energy demonstrates that in practice there is a
continuum of perspectives. Each may be appropriate for answering a diﬀerent question.
Evaluating the incentives of participants in a market generally requires doing the analysis
from many perspectives.
I do not attempt here to rank order the beneﬁt-cost ratios for the major generation
technologies, which vary with the decision-maker’s preferences, the perceived costs of en-
vironmental externalities, and the state of technology. Technological progress, as well as
ongoing research on externalities, would make any such table obsolete shortly after it is
printed. However, the microeconomic tools to carry out and to critique such analysis are
longer lived. In this paper, I use the current issues in renewable energy cost analysis to
illustrate the use, and occasional misuse, of those tools.
II. Generation Costs of Conventional and Renewable Energy
Though renewable sources other than hydro-electricity have grown very quickly in the
last decade, they were starting from a miniscule base, and they remain a very small share
of total generation today due primarily to their high direct cost. Table 1 presents the share
of electricity generated from conventional and renewable sources for regions of the world
and selected countries during 2007, the most recent year for which comparable worldwide
data are available. Coal is the dominant generation source worldwide, with natural gas,
hydro-electricity and nuclear power also playing major roles.
Coal and natural gas remain the lowest-cost technology for new generation in most parts
of the world. These cost comparisons, however, show remarkable variance, with renewable
generation far from competitive in some studies and quite economical in others. Nearly all
of these studies calculate a levelized cost of electricity, but as I discuss below, the exact
economic assumptions made can drive enormous variation.
3Table 1: Electricity Generation By Source
Units are billion kWh.  Data are for 2007.
Region/Country Total Natural Coal Nuclear Hydro- Oil and Wind Geo- Solar Other
Gas electric other thermal Renewables
OECD liquids*
  OECD North America 5,003 20% 44% 18% 13% 3% 0.8% 0.4% 0.0% 1.3%
    United States 4,139 22% 49% 19% 6% 2% 0.8% 0.4% 0.0% 1.3%
    Mexico 244 37% 18% 4% 11% 26% 0.0% 2.9% 0.0% 1.2%
  OECD Europe 3,399 22% 29% 26% 15% 2% 2.9% 0.3% 0.1% 3.1%
  OECD Asia 1,747 23% 40% 22% 7% 6% 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 1.4%
    Japan 1,063 28% 31% 24% 7% 8% 0.2% 0.3% 0.0% 2.1%
      Total OECD 10,149 21% 38% 21% 12% 3% 1.4% 0.4% 0.1% 1.9%
Non-OECD
  Non-OECD Europe and Eurasia 1,592 36% 25% 17% 18% 4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
    Russia 959 40% 23% 15% 18% 3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2%
  Non-OECD Asia 4,779 10% 69% 2% 14% 4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.0% 0.3%
    China 3,041 2% 80% 2% 14% 2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
    India 762 6% 71% 2% 16% 3% 1.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3%
  Middle East 674 57% 5% 0% 3% 35% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
  Africa 581 25% 45% 2% 17% 11% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2%
  Central and South America 1,009 15% 6% 2% 65% 9% 0.1% 0.3% 0.0% 2.6%
      Total Non-OECD 8,634 20% 47% 5% 20% 7% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.5%




Source: EIA International Energy Outlook 2010, Tables H11 ‐ H20A. A Brief Guide to Levelized Cost of Electricity Estimates
The levelized cost of electricity for a given generation plant is the constant (in real terms)
price for power that would equate the net present value of revenue from the plant’s output
with the net present value of the cost of production.2 Levelized cost estimates depend
on numerous engineering factors that vary with the technology being reviewed, but these
are not usually the main drivers of variation in estimates for a given plant. Current
technological speciﬁcations for a plant are comparatively easy to establish with reasonable
precision; for the most part, researchers agree on what inputs are going in and what
outputs result. Economic variables are usually behind large discrepancies among levelized
cost estimates. These include assumptions about inﬂation rates, real interest rates, how
much the generator is used, and future input costs, including fuel costs. Engineering factors
also interact with these economic considerations; for example, the optimal usage of a plant
will depend on the marginal cost of production, the speed with which its output can be
adjusted, and the market price (plus other compensation, such as marginal subsidies) that
the generator receives. The best levelized cost studies state these assumptions clearly, but
many do not.
Because generation plants are heterogeneous in location, architecture, and other factors,
even plants with similar technology will not have the same levelized cost of electricity.
The variation tends to be relatively small for coal and gas plants because the fuel is fairly
standardized and the plant operation is less aﬀected by location. Even these plants’ costs,
however, are aﬀected by idiosyncratic site characteristics (including property values), local
labor costs, environmental constraints, access to fuel transportation, and access to electric-
ity transmission lines, as well as variation in technical eﬃciency of operation. Production
from solar and wind generation is largely driven by local climate conditions, which greatly
increases the variance across projects in levelized cost.
The variation in levelized cost across plants with the same technology raises an important
caveat: levelized cost studies are usually based on the average outcome at existing or recent
2 If a plant lasts N periods and produces qn in period n, then discounting future cash ﬂows at the real


















where Cn(q1,..,qN) is the real (in period 0 dollars) expenditures in period n to produce the stream of
output (q1,..,qN). As [1] suggests, some capital costs are borne before any production can take place.
4plants, but they are generally intended to guide future investment decisions. Technological
progress, learning-by-doing and economies of scale in building multiple plants will tend to
make the cost of the marginal plant lower than the average of existing or recent facilities,
but scarcity of high-quality locations will tend to cause the cost of a new plant to be
higher than the pre-existing average. Some studies are explicitly prospective, evaluating
the levelized cost of a technology that the authors assume will be installed in some future
year. These are necessarily the most speculative, forecasting future technological progress,
which gives the authors great latitude to make varying assumptions that yield widely
varying levelized cost estimates.
The lack of comparability in levelized cost analyses is particularly troubling because
these cost ﬁgures are frequently the central focus of policy discussions about alternative
technologies. These ﬁgures can potentially be quite useful benchmarks, but they must be
thoughtfully adjusted for the attributes of the power produced and other impacts of the
generation process.
I consider here only studies for U.S. generation. Costs vary around the world, both due
to varying technologies and expertise, and because fuel costs and regulations diﬀer.
B. Estimates of Levelized Costs of Electricity
With those cautions, Figure 1 presents levelized cost estimates for major electricity gen-
eration technologies. The notes to ﬁgure 1 presents details of the calculations.3 Clearly,
the range of estimates can be signiﬁcant and the details in the notes demonstrate why.
Many of the studies include subsidies and tax beneﬁts to the generator itself. With suﬃ-
cient subsidy, of course, any technology can appear to have a low cost. Nonetheless, these
calculations can still be relevant for private decision making. A separate issue, which I
discuss below, is accounting for upstream subsidies to fuel supply or transportation.
Coal and natural gas – the two leading sources of electricity generation – are fuel-
intensive technologies (in terms of cost share) relative to all others, with natural gas being
the most fuel-intensive of the major generation technologies.4 Thus, forecasts of future fuel
prices play a large role in levelized cost estimates. These forecasts have high variance due to
uncertainty about the exhaustability of the resource, technological progress in exploration
3 Also see Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group III (2011) for discussion of re-
newable energy technologies and Annex III for levelized cost estimates.
4 Oil-ﬁred generation is even more fuel intensive, but has a very small share of grid-connected generation
in the United States due to its high cost.
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Solar PV: Capacity factor: 20% ‐ 28%; Notes: Range $126 ‐ $260 / MWh  and extraction, and government regulation (see Holland (2003)).
Variation in technology and usage within a generation fuel source can also greatly aﬀect
levelized cost. Combined-cycle gas turbine plants are highly eﬃcient (in terms of “heat
rate,” the amount of fuel energy needed to generate a unit of electricity), but relatively
costly to build, while single-cyclegeneration combustionturbine gas plants are less eﬃcient,
but much cheaper to build. As a result, combined-cycle plants tend to run most of the time,
while combustion turbines are used primarily at peak times, running far fewer hours per
year. The levelized costs of these two technologies are quite diﬀerent, but the comparison
isn’t informative, because they are intended for diﬀerent uses. Because electricity demand
is quite variable and electricity is not storable in a cost-eﬀective way, there is demand for
some “baseload” generation that run in most hours and some “peaker” generation that is
called on for relatively few hours per year. Neither technology could eﬃciently substitute
for the other.
Hydro-electric and geothermal generation are generally viewed as renewable. They can
be inexpensive, but locations that are usable and high-productivity are quite limited.
Large-scalehydro-electricitygeneration also creates such major alterations to the landscape
that it is generally not considered environmentally friendly. In addition, hydro-electric
generation usually faces a limit on the total energy that can be produced in a year or other
time frame due to precipitation and water storage limits.
The three broad categories of renewable energy that are considered closest to being scal-
able and cost competitive are wind, solar and biomass. Wind and solar are also location-
limited, though not to the same extent as hydro and geothermal. Studies have identiﬁed
suﬃcient sites that if these locations were developed with wind and solar generation they
could make the technology the dominant electricity sources in the United States – see
NREL (2010) on wind power and Fthenakis et al (2009) on solar. The more signiﬁcant
barriers are cost of generation, cost of transmitting the power to where demand is, and the
value of the power generated. The lowest-cost wind power is usually generated in fairly
remote locations, so the cost of infrastructure to transmit the power to demand sites can
be signiﬁcant. Transmission costs for connection to the grid are generally not included
in levelized cost estimates, in part because they are so idiosyncratic by project. Local
resident resistance to transmission lines and incomplete property rights in some cases can
also create signiﬁcant regulatory uncertainty.
Solar power encompasses two diﬀerent fundamental technologies. Solar thermal gener-
6ation focuses sunlight on a heat transfer ﬂuid that is used to create steam, which is then
used in a turbine to drive a generator. Photovoltaic systems use semiconductors to convert
sunlight directly to electricity.5 Either technology can be used for large-scale generation in
open space, known as utility-scale generation – while photovoltaic panels can be installed
at small scale near demand – such as on residential rooftops.
Rooftop solar reduces the need for investment in high-voltage transmission lines that
carry power from large-scale generation to local distribution wires. Some argue that it also
reduces the cost of the local distribution networks, but there do not seem to be reliable
studies on the distribution cost impact, as I discuss below. Economies of scale at the local
distribution level are signiﬁcant, suggesting the marginal savings from reduced ﬂow on
distribution lines is well below the average cost of distribution per kilowatt-hour. Small-
scale rooftop solar, such as on a single-family home, also enjoys fewer economies of scale
in construction or panel procurement, so the up-front cost per unit of capacity tends to be
much greater.6
Biomass is a broad category that includes both burning the inputs directly and biomass
gasiﬁcation, in which the inputs are heated to produce a synthetic gas. The primary
biomass fuels are wood scraps and pulping waste, but also agricultural residue, landﬁll
gas, and municipal solid waste. The levelized cost of biomass tends to depend to a great
extent on the idiosyncratic local cost of collecting and preparing the fuel relative to the
energy it produces. In 2007, it provided about half of the non-hydro renewable electricity
generation in the U.S. and the world. Mostly, this is from mixing biomass with coal and
burning in a conventional coal-ﬁred power plant, which requires fairly small incremental
equipment investments. Such approaches represent the lower end of the levelized cost
estimates in ﬁgure 1, but the opportunity for expansion are limited.
C. Limitations of Using Levelized Cost Estimates to Compare Electricity Technologies
Although levelized cost in some form has been the starting point for cost comparisons
since the beginning of electricity generation – McDonald (1962) discusses levelized cost
comparisons from the early 20th century – it is by no means the ﬁnal word. This is
5 The International Energy Agency provides brief useful overviews of alternative energy technologies at
http://www.iea.org/techno/essentials.htm.
6 To some extent the lower panel cost for large photovoltaic farms is a pecuniary economy, not representing
real resource savings, if it is just a rent transfer from sellers to buyers. But to the extent that the panel
cost is higher for small installations due to higher shipping or transaction costs of small orders, or
because of the need to customize panel selection to particular types of installations, those probably
reﬂect real cost diﬀerences.
7primarily because electricity generation technologies have diﬀerent temporal and spatial
production proﬁles.
Because electricity is very costly to store, wholesale prices can vary by a factor of 10 or
more within a day. As a result time variation in production, and the operator’s control
over that variation, greatly aﬀects the value of power produced. Generation resources over
which an operator has greater temporal control are considered “dispatchable,” while those
that vary signiﬁcantly due to exogenous factors are considered “intermittent.” Joskow
(2011a) and Joskow (2011b) discuss in detail the impact of temporal output variation on
the value of power produced by diﬀerent generating sources.
Among conventional gas and coal plants, there are constraints on how quickly a plant’s
output level can be increased or decreased (“ramping rates”), how long the plant must
remain oﬀ once it has been shut down, and how frequently it must be shut down for planned
or unplanned maintenance, as well as the cost of starting the plant. Economic tradeoﬀs also
arise here between short-run beneﬁts of pushing the plant to or beyond the engineering
speciﬁcations and the longer-run costs of increased wear on the plant components that
cause greater need for planned outages and greater incidence of unplanned outages.
Gas-ﬁred peaker plants, for instance, have low fuel eﬃciency, but are very ﬂexible, with
rapid ramping capability and low start-up costs. Hydro-electric generation is also highly
valued for its ability to adjust output very quickly. If the optimal “dispatch” of a plant
implies that it will run disproportionately at times when electricity is of particularly high
value – as is the case with gas-ﬁred peaker generation and most hydro generation – then
any levelized cost comparison must be augmented with adjustment for this enhanced value
of the power that is produced.
Generation resources that depend on the local weather – such as wind and solar – are
intermittent and therefore the least dispatchable. Such generation is almost entirely out
of the control of the plant operator (although these technologies can be shut down fairly
easily and quickly, so the plant operator can usually put an upper limit on their output).
Power from intermittent resources must be evaluated in terms of the time at which it is
produced. Solar power is produced only during daylight hours and tends to peak in the
middle of the day. In many areas, this is close to coincident with the highest electricity
demand which usually occurs on summer afternoons. Thus, the average economic value of
generation from solar is greater than if it produced the same quantity of power on average
at all hours of the day. Wind power often has the opposite generation pattern in the United
8States, in most locations producing more power at night and at times of lower demand
and prices.
Adjustmentfor the time variation of production is straightforward: comparethe levelized
cost to the average wholesalevalue of the power it delivers. In Borenstein (2008a) I ﬁnd that
power from solar photovoltaics in California is likely to be about 20 percent more valuable
than the average power sold in the state, because it is produced disproportionately at high-
priced times. The premium would be as high as 50 percent if the wholesale market were
allowed to clear at very high prices, but that doesn’t occur, because grid operators contract
separately for stand-by generation capacity, known broadly as “generation reserves,” which
they use to meet demand spikes and supply outages without allowing prices to rise too high
at peak times. Fripp and Wiser (2008) ﬁnd that wind power production in the west is likely
to be between zero and ten percent less valuable per unit than if the power were produced
equally on average at all times, though that study may understate the appropriatediscount
in wind value because it uses data from a period of very low power price volatility.
However, even this temporal adjustment for wholesale power prices doesn’t completely
capture the granularity over which the true value of power ﬂuctuates. Because electricity
is not storable at reasonable cost and the demand side of the market has had limited
opportunity to respond to price ﬂuctuations in very short time intervals, it is more cost
eﬀective to build back-up generation in suﬃcient quantity to have most adjustment occur
on the supply side of the market.7 The presence of back-up generation in itself is not a
barrier to eﬃcient pricing that reﬂects the actual shadow value of power at each point in
time, though the shadow value is likely to be low at most times. The presence of back-up
generation in itself is not a barrier to eﬃcient pricing that reﬂects the actual shadow value
of power at each point in time, though the shadow value is likely to be low at most times.
Grid operation, however, has never been based on such a precise market model.8 In the
more than 20 years in which merchant generators have played a signiﬁcant role in U.S.
electricity markets, however, grid operators have generally procured reserve generation
and charged it to the system as a whole. Thus, the cost to the system of an intermittent
producer has been socialized across all generators and prices have not fully reﬂected the
7 The technology for near-instantaneous demand response now exists, but questions remain about the
cost-eﬀectiveness of incorporating such sophisticated demand activity. If customers found it acceptable
to have their thermostat respond automatically to retail price changes, i.e., considered the associated
cost to be fairly low, then the cost of intermittency could be substantially reduced. See Callaway (2009).
8 This makes sense under the old utility model, in which all generation was owned by the same company,
which solved a complex optimization problem and implemented the solution administratively.
9time-varying value of power. There is now an active debate about how much the failure
to assign these costs of intermittency to speciﬁc generators skews incentives.
Adjusting levelized cost estimates for the intermittency clearly depends on the degree
to which intermittency requires additional generation reserves, or increases the risk of a
supply shortage that causes blackouts or brownouts. While a grid can easily handle very
small shares of intermittent resources – in fact, to a grid operator they look almost the
same as the stochastic component of demand that supply must follow – some grid engineers
have argued that the cost will increase more than proportionally if intermittent resources
constitute a signiﬁcant share of generation, such as 20 percent or more, as is currently
contemplated and has been achieved in some locations in Europe. This too is an area of
active debate; a detailed discussion appears in New York Independent System Operator
(2010). Ideal market pricing would reveal the value of a generator’s production at every
instant, but wholesale electricity markets are not set up to generate such ﬁne-grained price
signals.
There is also a multi-year temporal issue that complicates comparisons of levelized costs.
Levelized cost does not incorporate any variation in the real value of power across years.
For instance, if the real cost of electricity is expected to rise substantially over time, then
power produced in the near-term is less valuable than in the distant future. Comparing
levelized costs implicitly assumes that the real marginal value of power will be constant.
This assumption is particularly important if the output proﬁles of two generators diﬀer
substantially, such as comparing a nuclear plant that will take ﬁve to ten years to build to
solar panels that will start producing within a year or less.
Just as the value of electricity varies temporally due to storage constraints, it also varies
locationally due to transmission constraints. Complete locational pricing is diﬃcult logisti-
cally due to the complex physics of power ﬂows, but a number of areas of the United States
do have what is known as “locational marginal pricing” that sends fairly eﬃcient short-
run price signals. The greater challenge in locational pricing is in the long run, because
the full incremental cost of adding new transmission capacity can diﬀer signiﬁcantly from
the direct infrastructure cost once one accounts for the resulting change in transmission
capacity on all lines in the grid. Highly granular pricing – in both time and location – had
less value in the historical electricity supply paradigm with less reliance on intermittent
generation and a single utility that could coordinate long-term generation and transmission
investment, and internalize the externalities created by each in terms of grid capacity and
intermittency. Even in the markets that remain regulated today, many of these issues still
10arise as regulated utilities buy much more power from independent generators than they
did 10 or 20 years ago.
Locating electricity generation at the customer site, known as “distributed generation,”
engenders the most controversy in locational valuation. Retail prices are a very poor guide
to locational value, because they include signiﬁcant ﬁxed cost recovery (e.g., the ﬁxed
costs of local distribution networks) and they reﬂect little or none of the locational (or
time) variation in wholesale power purchase or production cost. At one extreme, some
advocates of distributed solar and wind generation argue that customers should not only
be able to reduce their power bills to zero by generating as much power over a billing
period as they consume, they should be paid the retail rate by the utility for any net
power they contribute to the system. At the other extreme, some grid engineers argue
that intermittent distributed generation not only doesn’t reduce local distribution costs
much at all – so should be compensated no more than the wholesale price of power –
the intermittent nature of the power and the reverse ﬂow from customers increases the
stress on distribution transformers and increases the frequency of repairs. At the heart
of this conﬂict is an internal inconsistency in the utility revenue model: local electricity
distribution service is a regulated, largely ﬁxed-cost, business, but costs are recovered
primarily through charges that vary with the quantity of electricity consumed. In the
United States, wholesale electricity costs average only about 50 to 75 percent of residential
retail electricity bills; most of the rest represents costs that don’t vary with marginal
electricity consumption.
Residential solar photovoltaic generation has been at the center of this debate. Resi-
dential solar does oﬀer greater value than suggested by its high levelized cost – because it
produces disproportionatelyat times of high demand, reduces transmissioninvestment, and
avoids the small percentage of power that is dissipated as heat when it is sent through the
transmission and distribution lines from a distant generator (Borenstein, 2008a). Nonethe-
less, retail rates don’t accurately reﬂect the social value of distributed solar generation.
With distributed generation, a signiﬁcant share of the savings customers see in their elec-
tricity bills would have gone to pay the utility’s ﬁxed costs. These costs change very little,
even in the long run, when customers generate some of their own power.
D. Subsidies and preferential tax treatment
Some of the levelized cost estimates shown in ﬁgure 1 and described in detail in the
notes reﬂect costs after direct subsidies and preferential tax treatments, and some don’t
11state clearly how subsidies and taxes are handled. Excluding subsidies and tax advantages
seems sensible for cost analyses that are intended to guide public policy, but even that
approach can be questioned. For instance, should state regulator consider federal sub-
sidies and tax breaks when evaluating a proposed renewable energy facility? Given the
political and logistical barriers to accomplishing Pareto improving trades in these markets,
the appropriate treatment will depend on whose welfare the decision maker weighs most
heavily.
Excluding direct subsidies and tax breaks from levelized cost analyses is relatively
straightforward, though it can be challenging in practice. Indirect subsidies that occur
upstream and aﬀect the price of inputs are somewhat more diﬃcult to sort out. Advocates
for renewable electricity argue that fossil fuel extraction receives special tax treatment in
the United States. While that is likely true, and subsidies for fossil fuels are larger than
for renewable energy in aggregate, the subsidy per kilowatt-hour for fossil fuel generation
is quite small. Adeyeye et al (2009) estimate that total subsidies for fossil fuels from
2002-2008 were $72 billion in the U.S., of which about $21 billion plausibly went to domes-
tically produced coal and natural gas that went into electricity production (most went to
oil production).9 Even if these subsidies were passed through 100% to consumers, which
seems highly unlikely in these internationally traded goods, that would amount to $0.0011
per kilowatt-hour of generation over this period.10 Other estimates of subsidies to coal and
natural gas for electricity generation are substantially lower (EIA, 2008) or many times
higher (Koplow, 2010), but over the range of subsidies claimed, the impact on electricity
generation costs will not materially aﬀect their comparison to renewable sources.
9 Based on the descriptions on page 7-16 of Adeyeye et a (2009), this includes all of the categories
that are primarily subsidizing coal: Credit for Production of Nonconventional Fuels ($14.1b), Black
Lung Disability Trust Fund ($1.0b), Characterizing Coal Royalty Payments as Capital Gains ($1.0b),
Exclusion of Beneﬁt Payments to Disabled Miners ($0.4b), Other-Fuel Exploration & Development Ex-
pensing ($0.3b), Other-Fuel Excess of Percentage over Cost Depletion ($0.3b), Special Rules for Mining
Reclamation Reserves ($0.2b), Natural Gas Distribution Lines Treated as Fifteen-Year Modiﬁed Accel-
erated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) Property ($0.1b), Expensing Advanced Mine Safety Equipment
($0.03b). In addition, for a number of oil and natural gas items, I’ve prorated for the value of natural
gas used in electricity generation as a share of all oil and gas production in the U.S. (which average
about 16% over this period). These include Oil and Gas Exploration & Development Expensing ($7.1b),
Oil and Gas Excess Percentage over Cost Depletion ($5.4b), Exception from Passive Loss Limitations
for Oil and Gas ($0.2b). I also include in this category Reduced Government Take from Federal Oil and
Gas Leasing ($7.0b), which is charging below-market rates for leases. These are arguably subsidies, but
they are actually unlikely to be passed through to prices for natural gas. I do not include the Foreign
Tax Credits, which could be subsidies, but are extremely unlikely to aﬀect domestic prices for natural
gas or coal.
10 According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration “Electricity Net Generation” spreadsheet,
coal and natural gas ﬁred generation produced about 19 trillion kilowatt-hours of electricity over this
seven-year period.
12In 29 U.S. state and the District of Columbia, renewable energy beneﬁts from a diﬀerent
sort of indirect subsidy, a minimum share of electricity that is mandated to come from
renewables, often termed a “renewable portfolio standard.” Nearly all such programs,
however, translate this quantity standard to some extent into a subsidy/taxsystem through
tradable credits for renewable energy, which can be purchased by retail electricity providers
in lieu of meeting the standard through their own generation. As a result, some calculations
of the economics of renewables may include the value of these credits. Whether such
value should be counted in a social cost calculation depends on whether the credit price
reﬂects the true cost of externalities avoided by the generation, which is diﬃcult to assess,
as I discuss in the next section. Schmalensee (2011) discusses the diﬀerent policies for
promoting renewable energy generation and their eﬀectiveness.11
With many factors aﬀecting calculations of the full cost and beneﬁt of generation tech-
nologies, claims that a new technology has attained “grid parity” must be interpreted with
great caution. Advocates of wind generation who argue that it is at grid parity in some
locations generally do not adjust for the timing, location and intermittency factors that
can make wind substantially less valuable. Residential solar photovoltaic power is some-
times claimed to be at grid parity if it saves the customer money (usually, after subsidies),
but such analyses do not consider that the retail electricity rate pays for much more than
just the energy that the solar generation replaces. Of course, grid parity on market factors
alone is not the socially optimal driver of technology choice if some technologies produce
greater negative externalities than others.
III. Incorporating Environmental Externalities
Until the 1960s, air pollution from conventional electricity generation was largely un-
regulated and in that sense “free” to the polluter. But in the 1960s and 1970s, legislation
restricted the rights of generators to emit local air pollutants, particularly sulfur diox-
ide, nitrous oxides, and mercury. These policies didn’t put prices on pollutants, but were
command and control regulation, such as requiring the installation of smokestack devices
(“scrubbers”) that remove sulfur dioxide and other pollutants. In the last two decades,
carbon dioxide has been found to be a major contributor to climate change, leading to
eﬀorts to restrict its emissions as well. About 33 percent of anthropogenic greenhouse
gas emissions in the United States come from the electric power sector, with 27 percent
11 Also see http://www.dsireusa.org/, a comprehensive database of such programs in the U.S.
13coming from transportation, 20 percent from industry, and the remaining 20 percent is
from agriculture, commercial or residential (EPA (2011), table 2-12).
In a ﬁrst-best economic world, pollution rights would be just another input to the pro-
duction of electricity from a given technology and would automatically be included in the
levelized cost calculation. In most of the United States and the world, however, markets
for rights to emit greenhouse gases or local pollutants are spotty at best. Most levelized
cost estimates do not include the costs of emissions directly, though they do generally in-
clude the cost of technology that must be installed in order to meet command and control
regulations.
A large literature exists on the marginal social cost of the air pollutants that power
plants emit. For local pollutants, the cost varies across plants and depends very much on
the population density, climate and geography around the plant, as well as the presence
of other pollutants (Fowlie and Muller (2010)). For greenhouse gases, the damage is not
localized, so valuation is much more uniform across plants. All of these studies rely heavily
on meteorological, climate and public health models, as well as valuations of statistical
lives. Muller and Mendelsohn (2007) explain the details and uncertainties of such studies
and present estimates of the cost of local pollutants. The caveats applied to local pollution
cost estimates are even stronger for estimates of the marginal social costs of greenhouse
gas emissions, because there is even more uncertainty in the underlying climate and public
health models. Greenstone, Kopits and Wolverton (2011) present a detailed discussion of
the uncertainties in estimating the social cost of greenhouse gas emissions.
Absent government intervention, the external costs will not be borne by producers and
will not aﬀect choices among electricity generation technology. The obvious solution is to
price the externalities – either through a tax or tradable permit program. The relative
merits of these approaches have been debated at length (Keohane (2009), Metcalf (2009),
and cites therein). Still, the reality is that both approachesremain relatively rare compared
to alternative interventions such as technology mandates and subsidies for green power.
Technology mandates for pollution controls on conventional electricity generation have
been and remain the most common response to these market failures. Technologies to
remove some pollutants from the smokestack emissions of power plants have been used
since the 1960s. It is well known that such mandates can be ineﬃcient, because they apply
uniform standards to emitters with very diﬀerent production proﬁles, costs of meeting the
regulations, and costs of alternative technologies or production changes that would allow
14similar pollution reductions. Also known, but less highlighted, command and control
regulations don’t account for whether the emissions occur at times when they are likely to
be more or less damaging to publichealth. This is particularlyimportantfor nitrous oxides,
which under some, but not all, meteorological conditions combine with volatile organic
compounds (VOCs) and sunlight to make ozone. Even pricing the externality solves this
problem only if prices reﬂect such variation, which is often not the case, generally for
reasons of simplicity (Fowlie and Muller (2010)).
Subsidies for green power (or mandated utility oﬀer prices, known as “feed-in tariﬀs”)
have been portrayed as nearly equivalent to pricing externalities, but more politically
acceptable. This approach, however, is very problematic for three closely related reasons.
First, subsidizing green power for reducing pollution (relative to some counterfactual) is
not equivalent to taxing “brown” power to reﬂect the marginal social damage. If end-
use electricity demand were completely inelastic and green and brown power were each
completely homogeneous, they would have the same eﬀect; the only impact of the subsidy
would be to shift the production share towards green and away from brown power. But
the underlying market failure is the under-pricing of brown power, not the over-pricing of
green power, so subsidizing green power from government revenues artiﬁcially depresses
the price of power and discourages eﬃcient energy consumption.12 As a result, government
subsidies of green power lead to over-consumptionof electricity and disincentives for energy
eﬃciency. In addition, for any given level of reduction, it will be achieved more eﬃciently
by equalizing the marginal price of the pollutant across sectors as well as within sectors.
This is not achievable through ad hoc subsidies to activities that displace certain sources
of emissions. Fowlie, Knittel and Wolfram (forthcoming) estimate that failure to achieve
uniform marginal prices in the NOx emissions in the U.S. has raised the cost of regulation
by at least 6 percent.
Second, subsidizing green power generally fails to recognize the heterogeneity within the
green power sector and among the brown power sources that are being displaced. Solar
power that reduces coal-ﬁred generation lowers greenhouse gas emissions by about twice as
much on average as if it reduces natural-gas-ﬁred generation. Assuming that the marginal
generation displaced is equal to the average generation mix in the system can be a poor
approximation. A number of studies have attempted to go further and infer the generation
12 Green power subsidies that are paid for through a general surcharge on electricity are likely to be a step
in the right direction, but only in very special cases do they result in electricity prices that reﬂect the
social cost of pollution.
15that is displaced by an incremental unit of power from wind or solar within a system,
accounting for the timing and location of the green power (for example, Callaway and
Fowlie (2009), Cullen (2011) and Gowrisankaran, Reynolds and Samano (2011)). These
studies have made clear how diﬃcult it is to identify the alternative generation emissions
even after the fact. But to give eﬃcient long-run incentives for investment, policy makers
must commit to subsidies well before they could have the data to calculate the alternative
emissions. The problem arises because subsidizing green power is an indirect approach to
the pollution problem, and the relationship between green power and emissions avoided is
not uniform. It would not arise with a direct tax (or pricing through tradable permits) on
pollution.13
Third, because subsidizing green power addresses the policy goal only indirectly, it in-
troduces an opportunity for what might be called “beneﬁt leakage” in which the impact
on the policy goal takes place out of the immediate area. If producing more green power in
one state lowers the production of brown power in a distant area that exports electricity to
the state, then the beneﬁts of the pollution reduction are less likely to ﬂow to those under-
writing the subsidies. Obviously, with greenhouse gases this would just be an accounting
issue, not a real change in the beneﬁts, but with local pollutants the local environmen-
tal gains from subsidizing green power could be much less than would be suggested by a
calculation that assumes no change in trade.
All energy sources have environmental implications for which property rights have not
been clearly assigned or would be costly to enforce. Wind turbines harm birds, as well
as create low-frequency thumping that some people ﬁnd diﬃcult to live with. Large scale
solar projects in the desert can endanger habitat for native animals. Solar photovoltaic
panels contain some heavy metals that require careful handling in disposal. Geothermal
generation may cause ground water pollution and small-scale seismic activity. Tidal and
wave power – both in nascent development stages – will likely run into concern that the
generators interfere with marine life. Coal mining creates signiﬁcant quantities of solid
waste. Oil and gas production can result in leaks that spoil nearby ecosystems, including
recent concerns about the environmental impact of ﬂuids used in hydraulic fracturing. And
nearly all generation sources are at some point accused of visual pollution.
13 Both subsidizing green and taxing brown power require committing to the level of a policy instrument
– such as prices or quantities – with only imperfect knowledge of its optimal level. Subsidizing green
has the additional problem of setting the level of the policy instrument while knowing only imperfectly
the relationship between the policy instrument and the variables of real interest.
16Many of these externalities involve substantial costs which mean substantial wealth
transfers and potentially large eﬃciency implications. Externalities from fossil fuels have
triggered litigation for years. With each new energy source, new property rights conﬂicts
emerge and mustbe adjudicated. Even if Coasian eﬃciency results after property rights are
assigned, the assignment process is costly. In one vivid example in Sunnyvale, California
a conﬂict arose between one neighbor with solar panels and another with redwood trees
that had grown tall enough to shade the panels. After a lengthy lawsuit, the solar panels
won out and the redwood tress had to be removed (Rogers (2008)).
IV. Non-Environmental Externalities
While environmental externalities are the leading argument for public policy that en-
courages alternative energy sources, it is certainly not the only argument made. With the
failure to pass signiﬁcantclimate change legislation in the ﬁrst 2 years of the Obama admin-
istration and the shift in Congressional power after January 2011, the non-environmental
justiﬁcations have become more prominent in public policy discussions. These arguments,
however, are generally much less persuasive.
A. Energy Security
“Energy security” is rarely deﬁned precisely, but the phrase generally is used to suggest
that the United States should produce a higher shareof the energy it uses. One justiﬁcation
is macroeconomic: If the price of a fuel for which the U.S. is highly import-dependent
rises suddenly, the common wealth shock to most consumers could potentially disrupt the
macroeconomy. Empirically, this argument may apply to oil – the U.S. now consumes
nearly twice as much oil as it produces – but it does not apply to coal or natural gas, for
which the U.S. is about self-suﬃcient. The U.S., however, uses almost no oil in producing
electricity. Energy security arguments could perhaps support a move towards electric cars
(or other alternatives to oil for transportation fuels). In that case, however, producing the
electricity from coal or natural gas enhances energy security as much as producing it from
renewable. In addition, electricity from coal and natural gas is less expensive, so using
those sources would make electric transportation more aﬀordable and would do more to
enhance energy security. The distinct advantage of renewable electricity generation is its
lower environmental impact, not its ability to enhance energy security.
A second “energy security” argument is that high energy prices enrich some energy-
exporting countries that are hostile to U.S. global interests. By reducing use of these fuels,
17the argument goes, the U.S. could lower the price of energy, which would both help U.S.
consumers and reduce the wealth ﬂows to hostile regimes and possibly reduce military
expenditures directed towards to ensuring unimpeded energy trade. This argument again
does not have traction in analysis of coal or natural gas in the U.S. Even in oil-importing
countries where oil is a signiﬁcant source of electricity generation, the quantities of oil
used for generation are so small relative to the world oil market that replacing them with
renewables is unlikely to have any noticeable impact on world oil prices, as indicated in
Table 1. This argument has been raised with more credibility in the context of European
natural gas purchases from Russia.
B. Non-appropriable Intellectual Property
Even with the strong intellectual property laws that have been adopted in the most
advanced countries, in most cases a successful innovator captures little of the value he
or she creates. That surely creates some dynamic ineﬃciency, which governments have
addressed in many sectors by subsidizing basic research. Whether this incentive problem
is any greater in energy than other sectors in not clear, but it is clear that U.S. government
expenditures on energy R&D have been much smaller as a share of GDP contribution than
in healthcare, defense or technology (NSF (2010), Chapter 4). Government support for
generating fundamental scientiﬁc knowledge in energy has increased with the creation of
the Advanced Research Projects Agency - Energy within the Department of Energy in
2009, but the ARPA-E budget for 2012 is likely to be under $200 million. Studies from
across the political spectrum have suggested it should be 50 percent to many times higher
(Augustine et al (2011) and Loris (2011)).
For renewable electricity technologies currently available, a common argument for subsi-
dies is that greater installation will lead to learning-by-doing that will drive down the cost
and price of the technology. This justiﬁes government intervention, however, only if the
knowledge from that learning-by-doing is not appropriable by the company that creates
it, that is, if the knowledge spills over to other ﬁrms. Though the argument has merit,
proponents frequently overstate the case.
First, most studies of learning-by-doing are not able to separate learning-by-doing from
other changes. In solar photovoltaic power, studies have shown that costs have come down
dramatically since the 1960s as the total number of installed panels has increased, with
estimates that every doubling of the installed base has on average been associated with
about a 20 percent decline in the cost of solar panels (for instance, Duke and Kammen
18(1999) and Swanson (2006)). Many factors that have changed costs over this time, as
Nemet (2006) points out. Signiﬁcantexogenous technological advances in crystalline silicon
solar technologies have resulted from investments made outside the commercial solar power
sector, especially public investments made as part of the U.S. space program and private
investments in the semiconductor industry. In addition, ﬁrms in the industry have simply
gotten larger, which has lead to savings from economies of scale – producing more units
of output in each period – rather than learning-by-doing, which is the knowledge gained
from a larger aggregate history of production over time.14
The distinction between learning-by-doing and economies of scale may seem minor, but
the implications for the economic analysis of public policy are immense. If one ﬁrm can
drive down its costs by producing at large scale in its factory or running a large scale
installation operation, those beneﬁts are highly appropriable by that large ﬁrm. Other,
smaller ﬁrms are not likely to experience a cost decline because a competitor is enjoying
economies of scale. Thus, signiﬁcant economies of scale in any industry, short of creating
a natural monopoly, are not generally seen as a basis for government intervention.
Learning-by-doing creates more spillovers, because knowledge is likely to be portable
across ﬁrms. Still, the evidence of strong learning-by-doing is thin and credible results on
spillovers are even more rare. Nemet’s (2006) analysis suggests that learning-by-doing has
actually played a relatively small role in the decline of solar photovoltaic costs over the last
30 years. He ﬁnds that the scope for learning-by-doing using the current crystalline silicon
technology is quite limited given the current state of the industry. While the evidence
of minimal learning-by-doing eﬀects in solar photovoltaics is not dispositive, it is more
convincing than any existing research claiming signiﬁcant eﬀects.
C. Green Jobs
The “job creation” justiﬁcation for government policies to promote renewable energy
took on greater prominence after the downturn that began in 2007 and the failure of
climate change legislation in Congress since then. In the green jobs debate of 2008-2010,
there was much confusion between the short-run stimulus goal and the longer run policy
of subsidizing green job creation. As a stimulus program, the advisability of subsidizing
renewable energy depends on how rapidly the investment can take place and the elasticity
of investment with respect to those subsidies. In general, the renewable energy sector
tends to require large up-front construction costs, which is likely to be attractive, but the
14 See also Barbose et al (2011) for a thorough presentation of changing photovoltaic costs over time.
19capacity to expand such projects rapidly is likely to be fairly limited.
When the economy recovers and the stimulus justiﬁcation fades, is there a longer-term
job creation justiﬁcation for subsidizing renewable energy? There is a static component
and a dynamic component of this question. The static view is simply that renewableenergy
and energy eﬃciency are more labor-intensive technologies for producing (or conserving)
energy than conventional energy production. The empirical support for these claims is
uneven, but even if true it is far from making the case that green job creation is welfare
improving. To the extent that renewable energy costs more, even after accounting for
environmental externalities, renewable energy absorbs more resources to produce the same
value of output – a unit of electricity – and lowers GDP compared to conventional sources.
It is possible that renewable energy creates “better” jobs than conventional sources, per-
haps by targeting workers whose incremental economic welfare is of particular importance
because they are otherwise diﬃcult to employ or because they would otherwise have very
low wage jobs.
The dynamic view is that investment in renewable energy is justiﬁable as an attempt
to change the equilibrium path of investment and the economy. One reason suggested
is that renewable energy is a growth industry and, implicitly, that private investors are
too slow to recognize the opportunity, leading to sub-optimal investment. Still, it seems
hard to argue in general that government policy makers are better at identifying emerging
business opportunities than the private sector. A more nuanced and potentially compelling
version of this argument is that up-front investment will create network externalities and
learning that spill over much more strongly intra-nationally than internationally, creating
a sustainable economic advantage for the country that makes the investment. Such eﬀects
could be important, but as countries make competing investments to become the dominant
center of renewable energy it seems likely that at least some of those rents would be
dissipated or transferred to ﬁrms that can choose their locations.
The network eﬀects argument is often heard in political debates, but evidence supporting
it is scarce. Both Germany and Spain have subsidized enormous investments in installation
of renewable energy, particularly solar. In 2008, Spain was the largest market for new solar
generation in the world, but its manufacturing and installation of new capacity virtually
disappeared in 2009 when the country cut back subsidies. Germany has continued to grow
installations of solar photovoltaics, more than quadrupling new capacity from 2008 to 2010,
but panel manufacturing in Germany declined from 77 percent of new installed capacity
in 2008 to 27 percent in 2010 as China and Taiwan have made massive investments in
20manufacturing.15
This is an area ripe for further research. I am not aware of any credible studies that
have compared the short-run stimulus eﬀect of green energy investment relative to other
stimulus policies, the quality of the jobs created in the long run by green energy investment,
or the ability of governments to make strategic investments that trigger a sustainable new
sector.
D. Lowering cost of fossil fuel energy
Increasing adoption of renewable energy lowers the demand for fossil fuels and drives
down their prices. As a public policy argument, to the extent that renewables are more
expensive, this is essentially advocating the exercise of monopsony power in the fossil fuel
market. That has clear ineﬃciencies – some fossil fuels are replaced by more-expensive
renewable power – but it still might be surplus-enhancing on net for the set of economic
actors that the policy maker represents. In the U.S., the impact of increasing renewable
power is to reduce demand for natural gas and coal. U.S. production of these fossil fuels
is nearly equal to consumption, so the impact is to transfer wealth from producers to
consumers. On the state level within the U.S., the impact is much more uneven since
many states are large importers of fossil fuels and a smaller number are large exporters.
The size of the impact on prices is also questionable. While some advocates have focused
on short-runprice variation, the impact of a long-term shift towards renewables will depend
on the long-run elasticity of supply for natural gas and coal. With the advent of hydraulic
fracturing, it seems likely that the long-run elasticity of natural gas supply has probably
become quite high. The long-run elasticity of coal supply is generally seen as quite high
as well (Miller, Wolak and Zhang (2011)). Thus, a shift to renewables is not likely have a
large impact on fossil fuel prices.
V. An Application to Residential Solar Photovoltaic Power
In this section, I apply the analytic approach described above to update the calculations
of levelized cost of residential solar power from Borenstein (2008a), taking into account
recent changes in the cost of solar photovoltaic systems.
According to Barbose et al (2011), residential-scale solar systems (less than 10 kilowatt
capacity) in 2010 varied in average price from $6.3/watt in New Hampshire to $8.4/watt
15 These data are from Earth Policy Institute at http://www.earth-policy.org/data center/C23.
21Table 2: Levelized Cost of Residential Solar Photovoltaic Power
Real Interest Rate 1% 3% 5% 7% 9%
Real Levelized Cost $0.249 $0.315 $0.389 $0.468 $0.551
Assumptions: Five kilowatt system costs $36,500 installed (California estimate for 2010 from Barbose et
al (2011, p. 21)). Panels last for 30 years with no shading or soiling and no maintenance costs, producing
on average 0.77 kilowatts over all hours in ﬁrst year (based on Sharp corporation calculator for SSW
facing panels in Sacramento, California (http://sharpusa.cleanpowerestimator.com/default.aspx). Output
of panels declines by 0.5% per year due to degradation (Barbose et al (2011, p. 47)). Inverter replaced
after 10 (at $2552) and 20 (at $2171) years, based on current cost of $3000 (Barbose et al (2011, p. 16))
declining by 2% annually in real terms (Borenstein (2008a) and cites therein).
in Utah, with California – by far the largest state for residential solar – at $7.30. Taking
California’s number as the benchmark, Table 2 presents the implied levelized cost of power
for a 5 kilowatt system located in Sacramento, California, under alternative real discount
rates. The underlyingassumptions, noted in the table, are intended to be median estimates,
if anything tilted somewhat towards a lower cost of solar power.
The real interest rate of 3 percent implies a levelized cost of $0.315 per kilowatt-hour.
I follow Borenstein (2008a) in adjusting for the timing of production, increasing the value
of residential solar by 20 percent, which is slightly higher than the estimated gains of 15%-
17% in a typical grid operation (with generation reserves) for Southwest facing panels in
Sacramento, but lower than the 40%-50% premium in an “ideal” economic grid with no
generation reserves and prices clearing the market hour by hour. I adjust for the location
of production, increasing value by just 1 percent as found in Borenstein (2008a), because
residential solar panels are not disproportionately located in congested areas. These eﬀects
are incorporated by adjusting the levelized cost down to $0.260 per kilowatt-hour (=
0.315
1.2·1.01). An additional downward adjustment of $0.02 per kilowatt-hour accounts for
long-run savings in transmission investment, as discussed in Borenstein (2008b, p. 10),
which brings the net cost to $0.240.16 This compares to levelized costs for combined-cycle
gas-ﬁred generation that are now generally below $0.08 per kilowatt-hour given recent price
forecasts for natural gas that account for supply increases from new production techniques.
Adjusting next for environmental externalities raises the issues discussed earlier about
the cost of those externalities. If one assumes that new residential solar generation substi-
tutes for new combined-cycle gas turbines, then the local pollutant reduction is valued at
about $0.0015 per kilowatt-hour according to Muller, Mendelsohn and Nordhaus (2011).
16 Even the ﬁgure $0.02 per kilowatt-hour is above the average transmission cost per kilowatt-hour in most
U.S. utilities including California.
22That leaves a cost gap between residential solar and combined-cycle gas turbine generation
of at least $0.158. The gas plant emits slightly less than 0.0005 tons of carbon dioxide per
kilowatt-hour of electricity, so residential solar would be cost competitive on a social cost
basis only if the cost of carbon dioxide emissions were greater than $316 per ton. Nearly
all social cost and price forecasts for carbon dioxide are well below $100 per ton (Green-
stone, Kopits and Wolverton, 2011), which leaves residential solar still at least $0.108 per
kilowatt-hour more expensive.
This analysis is for the cost of installation in 2010. Barbose et al (2011) report prelim-
inary data suggesting that costs for systems below 10 kilowatts fell $0.5 per kilowatt in
the ﬁrst half of 2011, but they don’t report details for California. Nonetheless, this high-
lights the fact that such cost analyses are in constant ﬂux as technology improves and as
supply/demand factors change. It’s also important to note that I have used the retail cost
of installation (before subsidies) to represent the social cost of photovoltaics. Depending
on the degree of capacity utilization, exercise of market power and the supply/demand
balance in the equipment and installation markets, retail price may be above or below
long-run marginal cost of production and distribution of a given technology.
This analysis does not account for distribution cost savings from distributed generation
or for spillovers from learning-by-doing, for which analyses oﬀer much less guidance. On
the other side, it also doesn’t incorporate reduced output due to shading or soiling of the
panels, or installation at a less-than-ideal angle due to the building orientation, as discussed
in Borenstein (2008b). Nor does it account for the cost of extra generation reserves to
backup intermittent generation. In addition, it does not incorporate the expected returns
to waiting and the option value of waiting: if cost declines are expected to occur for
exogenous reasons, then installing solar in the future could have a higher social net present
value that installing today. In addition, to the extent there is uncertainty about the rate
of cost declines – in solar and in alternatives to solar – then waiting retains the option
to pursue a diﬀerent technology for a given project if it turns out to be less expensive.
Nonetheless, this analysis does give a good notion of the gap that those omitted factors
would have to ﬁll on net in order for residential solar photovoltaics to cost-eﬀectively
substitute for gas-ﬁred generation.
Medium-scale and large-scale solar photovoltaics installations and large-scale solar ther-
mal generation are more cost competitive. Contracts for these larger systems are not
public, but reports in the industry press suggest the unsubsidized levelized cost from these
installations is probably between $0.15 and $0.20 per kilowatt-hour in 2011, before any of
23the market or externality adjustments, and likely using more than a 3% real cost of capital.
These systems enjoy the same production timing beneﬁt as residential solar, but less (or
none) of the reduction in line losses and transmission savings. These systems would require
a much lower cost of carbon dioxide to be competitive with gas-ﬁred generation, though
still probably $100 per ton or greater.
VI. Conclusion
The most important market failure in energy markets is almost certainly environmental
externalities and the single most eﬃcient policy would be to price those externalities ap-
propriately. Yet, the policy makers often ﬁnd pricing externalities to be very restricted or
impossible politically. Thus, the second-best discussion is over which, if any, alternative
policy interventions are likely to do the most good, or at least to do more good than harm.
Instead of pricing externalities, the far more prevalent government response has been
targeted programs to promote speciﬁc alternatives to conventional electricity generation
technologies. Justiﬁcations for such programs have generally begun with environmental
concerns, but often expanded to energy security, job creation, and driving down fossil fuel
prices, generally without support of sound economic analysis. Such targeted programs also
seem especially vulnerable to political manipulation, promoting technologies that beneﬁt
the most politically inﬂuential.
If governments are to implement reasoned renewable generation policy, it will be crit-
ical to understand the costs and beneﬁts of these technologies in the context of modern
electricity systems. This requires developing sophisticated levelized cost estimates, and
adjusting for both the market value of the power generated and the associated externali-
ties, so they can be usefully compared across projects and technologies. Such adjustments
are complex and frequently controversial. More research at the interface of the economics
and engineering of electricity markets would be very valuable, particularly on the cost of
intermittency, the beneﬁts of end-use distributed generation and the economic spillovers
from learning-by-doing and network externalities. Progress on these questions would en-
hance renewable energy public policy and private decision making, particularly in a world
where ﬁrst-best, market-based options are greatly restricted.
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